Foundations · Chapter 02
History of the firm
Firms exist because markets are costly to use. Agents make them cheap.
The costs of using a market instead of doing something in-house: searching, negotiating, writing contracts and checking they're kept. Ronald Coase argued that firms exist because these costs are high. Agents can do much of this work cheaply, which changes which activities are worth keeping inside a firm. Glossary ↗
The boundary of a firm is a choice about coordination. Buying a service means finding someone who can provide it, agreeing on the work and checking that the agreement is kept. Doing the same work inside the firm replaces some of those market transactions with management. Neither arrangement is free.
Coase’s account directs attention to those costs; Williamson adds the problems of opportunism and assets that are valuable only within a particular relationship. Together they give a more useful starting point than assuming that every new technical capability makes the existing organisation obsolete.
When the boundary moves
Agents may change the comparison by doing more of the search, contracting and monitoring involved in a transaction. Work that once needed a department may become practical to buy through a service or protocol. That is the proposition to examine, rather than a prediction that firms simply disappear.
There is a counterweight. An agent that makes an external transaction cheap may also make the business dependent on a platform. Fees, access rules and the cost of leaving belong in the calculation. A smaller organisation is not necessarily a less dependent one.
Deciding what stays inside
Begin with the activities the firm already carries out. For each one, compare the cost of coordinating it internally with the cost of buying the same outcome. Break the external cost into finding a provider, negotiating the agreement and making sure the work is done. Then ask which of those costs an agent can actually reduce.
Keep a written reason for retaining an activity where specialised assets, uncertain quality or opportunism make an external relationship difficult to govern. Where work moves out, name the platform it will rely on and how the business could leave. The decision is incomplete until it accounts for both the saving and the dependency.
The resulting organisation may be arranged around protocols, with fewer people coordinating more external work. That remains a hypothesis. The sources below include both the case for falling transaction costs and the argument that new gatekeepers can raise them again.